Detailed Conference Program

The event will begin in the Tamiami Hall Multipurpose Room, room 121, at the FIU Modesto Maidique Camus. You can find directions here.

This panel offers new research on how governments and bureaucracies in personalist regimes perform their functions. The focus is on political integrity, investigating cases of patronage, abuse of the principles of professionalism and depoliticization of the administration, and distribution of particularistic goods and services.

Panel Chair & Discussant: Kevin Evans, Florida International University

Papers

“The Economic Consequences of Personalist Leaders” [PDF]
Author: Fernando Bizzarro, Yale University

Abstract: What are the consequences of a personalist leader on a country's economy? Personalist leaders are often inexperienced, come to power spearheading narrow coalitions, and have shallow--if any--ties with academic, bureaucratic, or business communities, thus enacting policies that are more oriented to the short-term, and that are more often captured by narrow interests than those enacted by leaders whose career is more party-based.  As a consequence, when personalist leaders are in power, countries' economic performance should suffer, experiencing lower rates of economic growth, more economic crises, and fewer investments in growth-enhancing public goods. Building on my previous works on the economic consequences of strong, party-based regimes and on the political consequences of personalist leaders, this paper tests whether this is the case. Taking advantage of a novel measure of personalism for all world leaders from 1967 to 2015, it seeks to isolate the economic effects of the personalization of political leadership on a country's economic performance using advanced techniques for causal inference with observational data. This isolation could prove to be a critical contribution to the literature on personalism since personalist leaders often come to power in countries in crisis, thus making it hard to distinguish the effects of a new leader from the social and economic processes already in place.

“Personalism and Governability in Israel”
Author: Gideon Rahat, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract: This research explores the possible linkage between personalism and the problems of governability in Israel. In particular, it seeks to explain the slow response of the government to the new needs arising from the surprise terrorist attack - evacuating people, transporting soldiers to the front, military supply, and more.

“Personalist Leadership and Corruption: Evidence from Third Wave Democracies” [PDF]
Authors: Tatiana Kostadinova and Milena I. Neshkova, Florida International University

Abstract: Despite assertions that personalism in politics may cause backsliding and erosion of democracy, systematic empirical analyses of the effects of personalist leadership on the quality of government are still scarce. This study investigates the importance of having parties with a dominant leader in the national government for the integrity of political institutions. Specifically, we test how the prevalence of personalist parties among the ruling coalition affects the levels of grand (political) and petty (bureaucratic) corruption in a country. Given that personalist regimes tend to foster clientelist networks and instill neglect for the rules and chain of command, we expect to register higher levels of corruption among the political elite yet lower levels among the bureaucracy because of the uncertainty and unpredictability associated with the governing style of personalistic leaders. Data from 34 countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America support these expectations and demonstrate the need to better understand the consequences of personalism for good governance.

“Assessing Trump's Personal Brand Equity during the COVID-19 Crisis” [PDF]
Author: William G. Resh, University of Southern California

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between personal brand equity and public approval of a political actor’s performance. The premise of our work is that both political actors and administrative agencies accumulate brand equity over time, much like their commercial counterparts. Positive brand equity is a particularly important asset in polarized political environments; it can help raise government satisfaction, political actors’ approval ratings, and re-election chances. Moreover, the brand equity of administrative agencies can be used to shift blame, insulate, or bolster political principals in policy implementation. While previous studies on the relationship between brand equity in the public sector and public perception have emphasized the branding of places, policies and agencies, they have neglected the personal brand equity of key political actors. Using an online experimental survey, we explore President Trump’s brand equity in a national Public Service Announcement (PSA) effort (that is, the ‘Slow the Spread’ campaign postcard sent to American households in March 2020). To do so, we test whether implicit associations made by subjects between this PSA effort and President Trump are associated with higher or lower approval of his presidency, and his handling of the COVID-19 crisis. We find that President Trump’s name appears to carry negative brand equity conditioned by partisan effects.

Research discussed by participants in this panel includes analyses of the (mis-)use of authority by personalist leaders to weaken the institutions of oversight; changes in the country’s constitution to concentrate even more power or ensure longer stay in office for themselves; and relations with the media, the judiciary, and civil society organizations.

Panel Chair & Discussant: Marzia Oceno, Florida International University

Papers

"Democratic Backsliding and Endogenous Polarization" [PDF]
Authors: Joseph Wright, Pennsylvania State University (with Erika Frantz)

Abstract: What causes political polarization and how do partisan leaders and elites shape it? This project explains the origins of polarization by showing how opportunistic incumbent governments deepen polarization by attacking state institutions. While leading accounts of contemporary democratic decline posit that polarization causes democratic backsliding, we posit a more complicated portrait: incumbent actions that degrade democracy give rise to polarization, in turn deepening backsliding’s progression. From this perspective, polarization is both a cause and consequence of incumbent-led democratic backsliding. Our research theorizes a micro-level link between democratic backsliding events, elite opinion formation, and affective voter polarization; and demonstrates, using survey experiments, public opinion data and global macro-data, how political polarization is endogenous to democratic backsliding.

“Personalism and Executive Decision-making on Policy: An Exploratory Assessment of Causes and Consequences”
Author: Allan Rosenbaum, Florida International University

Abstract: Most policy decisions regarding major government initiatives are the product of extended discussion and negotiation, often resulting in major compromise between the executive who proposed or advocated for the initiative and a variety of interests. While chief executives often, and increasingly, are able to initiate incremental actions through use of one or another executive power, it is very rare for a major undertaking to be unilaterally initiated by chief executives. However, in a very few instances chief executives do take major undertakings that profoundly impact their countries - and often the world as well. Examples might include George Bush deciding to invade Iraq; Margaret Thatcher and the initiation of the Falklands War; and Thomas Jefferson taking what he very strongly believed to be the totally unconstitutional action of purchasing the Louisiana territory from France. While such decisions are rare, they often have profound consequences. Thus, it is useful to better understand what causes the leaders of governments to take such actions and what the consequences are likely to be. In particular, are their notable patterns of actions that help to better understand the circumstances leading to the initiation and consequences of such actions.

“Trump, Personalism, and US Administrative Capacity” [PDF]
Author: Donald Moynihan, McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University 

Abstract: This paper considers personalism in the context of the US federal government, focusing on Donald Trump. I argue that Trump represents an extraordinary degree of personalism in the Presidency, one that is all the more remarkable given the traditional power and capacity of the Republican Party. Trumpism did not offer a coherent ideological agenda, and was associated with modest legislative achievements, centering on Trump himself. The holding of office did not temper Trump's tendencies towards personalism. Indeed, the lesson he drew from his first term is that he needed to better institutionalize mechanisms of personal loyalty, to deal with perceived betrayals by both political appointees and career officials. Out of office, Trump supporters continued this project, seeking to rebuild governing institutions around personalist criteria, centered on loyalty. Both traditional party and aligned institutions, such as think tanks, as well as new and explicitly Trumpist organizations coalesced around Trump, enabling and encouraging his personalist leadership style as the template for future leaders. I argue that this process has a series of effects on American institutions, whether or not Trump returns to office. Trump’s model of personalism centered on a) elevating conspiracist messaging where he played a central role, such as QAnon, or claims about the 2020 election, b) were anti-statist in nature, particularly toward public institutions, framing them as corrupt in a way that undermined public trust and c) mainstreamed new strategies for governing, such as the politicization of the public service, and d) fit with a pattern of undermining democratic processes.

Food will be provided to participants, and all attendees are free to choose from any of the various eateries on campus.

Scholarship prepared for this panel discusses the decisions made by personalist governments in the policy areas of relations with other countries and international institutions, and national defense. The panelists search for answers to questions such as whether personalist leaders are more aggressive toward neighboring countries and more likely to engage into a war, and how decisions on national sovereignty and international cooperation are made.

Panel Chair & Discussant: Donovan A. Johnson, Florida International University

Papers

“The Foreign Policies of Africa’s Personalist Regimes” [PDF]
Author: John F. Clark, Florida International University

Abstract: Africa’s personalist regimes can be distinguished from both the continent’s de facto one-party states (like those of southern Africa) and from Africa’s few nascent democracies. This paper studies the foreign policies of Africa’s personalist regimes, emphasizing the pathways to power of the personal ruler. These pathways include successful insurgency, coup d’état, and, more rarely, success in relatively free elections in a democratic political environment. Chiefly, the paper attempts to account for two patterns of foreign relations that personalist regimes maintain with their African neighbors: one pattern, exhibited by personalist regimes in Eritrea, Rwanda, and Uganda is persistent unilateral intervention in neighboring countries; a second pattern is consistent restraint by personalist regimes toward their neighbors. In central Africa, the personalist regimes controlling Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon form a virtual security community, displacing mutual respect and restraint. In trying to account for these differing outcomes, this paper also examines the extra-continental relations of the personalist regimes with the BRICS countries, former European metropoles (notably, France), and the USA. The paper assesses whether pathways to power or other, more specific, circumstances account for the varying foreign policy behavior of personalist regimes.

“Brazilian Foreign Policy Under President Lula: Personalism, Partyism, or Foreign Ministry Dominance?” [PDF]
Author: Anthony W. Pereira, Florida International University

Abstract: For many years most observers of Brazilian foreign policy assumed that the Foreign Ministry enjoyed a near-monopoly in the formulation and execution of policy, due to its high degree of expertise, bureaucratic insulation, and esprit d'corps, as well as the low salience of foreign policy in electoral politics. This consensus about Foreign Ministry dominance of policymaking began to fray in the 1990s and 2000s, as scholars commented on the apparent "presidentialization" of foreign policy under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva (2003-2010) and the influence of civil society and economic organizations on policymaking. More recently, during the third term of President Lula (2023-present), speculation has focused on to what extent Brazilian foreign policy is driven by President Lula himself, his political party (the Partido dos Trabalhadores, or Workers' Party) and the Foreign Ministry. This paper attempts to assess the evidence for the influence of these actors on policymaking during the first year of the third Lula administration.

“War Termination in Personalist Regimes"
Author: Jessica L. P. Weeks, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Abstract: This project advances a theoretical framework combining insights from theories of war termination with insights from the literature on the domestic politics of personalist regimes to try to produce insights about the conditions under which personalist leaders settle versus prolong international wars.